Monetary integration in Eastern and Southern Africa: choosing a currency peg for COMESA by Carlos Vieira & Isabel Vieira
CEFAGE-UE, Universidade de Évora, Palácio do Vimioso, Lg. Marquês de Marialva, 8, 7000-809 Évora, Portugal 
Telf: +351 266 706 581  -  E-mail: cefage@uevora.pt  -  Web: www.cefage.uevora.pt 
 
C CE EF FA AG GE E- -U UE E   W Wo or rk ki in ng g   P Pa ap pe er r   
 







   
M Mo on ne et ta ar ry y   i in nt te eg gr ra at ti io on n   i in n   E Ea as st te er rn n   a an nd d   S So ou ut th he er rn n   A Af fr ri ic ca a: :   c ch ho oo os si in ng g   
a a   c cu ur rr re en nc cy y   p pe eg g   f fo or r   C CO OM ME ES SA A   









CEFAGE-UÉ, Universidade de Évora, Portugal 1 
 
Monetary integration in Eastern and Southern Africa: choosing a currency peg for 
COMESA 
Carlos Vieira and Isabel Vieira
1 
CEFAGE-UÉ, Universidade de Évora, Portugal 
 
Abstract: 
African countries involved in monetary integration projects have been advised to peg 
their currencies against an external anchor before the definite fixing of exchange rates. 
In this study we estimate optimum currency area indices to determine, between four 
alternatives,  which  international  currency  would  be  the  most  suitable  anchor  for 
COMESA members and for a set of other selected African economies. We conclude that 
the euro and the British pound prevail over the US dollar or the yen; that the euro would 
be the best pegging for most, but not all, COMESA members; and that some of these 
economies display evidence of more intense integration with third countries, with which 
they  share  membership  in  other  (overlapping)  regional  economic  communities,  than 
within COMESA.  
 
Key words: optimum currency areas, monetary anchor, currency pegs, African regional 
economic communities, African monetary integration. 
 
JEL Classification: F15; F33. 
                                                 
1 This paper is forthcoming in the South African Journal of Economics. Acknowledgements are due to 
the Journal, The Economic Society of South Africa and Blackwell Publishing. The definitive version is 
available at www.blackwell-synergy.com. The authors also acknowledge partial financial support from 





1 - Introduction 
Africa has been a fertile ground for economic integration projects. Amongst its various, 
and  sometimes  overlapping,  communities,  the  Common  Market  for  Eastern  and 
Southern Africa (COMESA)
2 aims at full monetary integration by the end of the 20s. 
However,  as  the  recent  Eurozone  experience  suggests,  monetary  unions  involving 
heterogeneous economies may jeopardise growth and employment perspectives in the 
least prepared members. In order to avoid such negative effects in Africa, monetary 
integration  should  be  mainly  oriented  by  real,  rather  than  nominal,  convergence 
objectives  and  evolve  gradually,  supporting  economic  development  and  progress 
achieved in trade integration and macroeconomic coordination. Accordingly, it has been 
suggested  that,  for  a  considerable  time  before  their  irrevocable  fixing,  domestic 
currencies  should  be  pegged  against  an  international  anchor.
3    Which  international 
currency should be chosen in the case of the COMESA and whether it would be a good 
choice for all its members are open questions that motivated this study. 
The paper considers four potential pegs - the euro, the dollar, the British pound and the 
yen – and utilises the optimum currency area (OCA) index proposed by Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen  (1997)  to  evaluate  their  relative  suitability  as  anchors  for  COMESA 
currencies. The first two moneys are the most likely candidates, being currently the 
major international currencies. However, as Mundell (2002) pointed out, the choice of 
the former  could be problematic for countries  with strong trade links  to the United 
States (US) if this country’s public and external debt problems promote a diversification 
away from the dollar and an appreciation of the euro. The United Kingdom (UK) has 
                                                 
2 COMESA current members are: Burundi, Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan (South Sudan became an independent 
nation on July 2011), Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
3 See for instance, Mundell (2002) and UNECA (2008). The latter specifically suggests a period of seven 
to ten years of pegging for COMESA currencies.  3 
 
strong historical ties with most of these African countries, currently as a partner in the 
Commonwealth of Nations. As it seems unlikely that the British pound is replaced by 
the euro in the next few years, it makes sense to evaluate its suitability as a reference 
currency,  in  the  context  of  this  analysis.  Finally,  the  Japanese  yen,  though  a  more 
unlikely choice, is considered for the fact that Japan is a major trade partner for many 
COMESA members, in some cases the most important of the four. 
Given the relatively low weight of intra African trade, even within regional economic 
communities, and thus the improbable choice of internal currency pegs, our study may 
also be useful for other planned African monetary unions. Accordingly, in addition to 
current  COMESA  members,  the  empirical  analysis  includes  other  relevant  African 
economies involved in integration projects aiming at full monetary integration, such as 
Morocco  and  Tunisia  (members  of  the  Arab  Maghreb  Union),  Ghana  and  Nigeria 
(members of the West African Monetary Zone and of the Economic Community of 
West African States) and South Africa and Tanzania (members of the Southern Africa 
Development  Community).  Other  countries,  belonging  to  the  two  CFA  franc  zones, 
whose currencies were pegged to the French franc and, since 1999, to the euro, are 
obviously not considered. 
As noted by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997, p. 761), although ‘many economists did 
not  like  it  very  much’,  the  OCA  theory  remained  ‘the  workhorse  for  analyses  of 
European  monetary  unification’.  The  theory  has  also  rooted  many  assessments  of 
monetary integration in Africa and is adopted as the basis for our empirical study, which 
uses the OCA index developed by the two authors. As discussed in more detail ahead, 
this approach does not cover all relevant considerations that decision makers should 
take  into  account.  The  index  comprises  various  OCA  characteristics  but  fails  to 4 
 
explicitly  take  into  account  the  dynamics  underlying  economic  and  monetary 
integration  processes,  also  disregarding  policy  discipline  and  institutional  credibility 
gains from monetary integration. 
However, both theoretical and empirical developments, of which the first ten years of 
full monetary union in Europe are a good example, suggest that the most challenging 
features of monetary integration draw from individual countries’ incapacity to smooth 
their economies in the  aftermath of  asymmetric shocks (or of common shocks with 
specific impacts across the integrated area). Such difficulties, resulting from strict fiscal 
constraints  and  from  the  absence  of  alternative  adjustment  mechanisms  capable  of 
providing at least some short term relief following a crisis, highlight the utility of real 
convergence  before  embarking  on  monetary  integration.  In  fact,  when  participating 
countries  exhibit  relatively  heterogeneous  productive  structures,  the  probability  of 
specific disturbances does not decline with the progress of integration, increasing the 
costs  of  monetary  unification.  The  OCA  index  encompasses  some  of  the  effects  of 
productive specialization, namely the asymmetry of shocks and the dissimilarity of the 
commodity composition of exports, and is thus one practical tool to evaluate monetary 
integration projects. 
 
2 - The optimum currency area theory, monetary integration in Africa and the 
choice of an international monetary anchor 
The  COMESA  convergence  criteria  require  that  all  member  countries  have  market 
determined foreign exchange rates by 2015.
4 Currently, though some progress has been 
                                                 
4 Revised convergence criteria for COMESA are fully detailed in UNECA (2008), p. 199. 5 
 
achieved, different regimes, presented in Table 1, and some government intervention 
still prevail amongst COMESA members.  
 
Table 1: COMESA countries’ exchange rate regimes 
  Monetary Policy Framework 
Exchange rate 
arrangement 
Exchange Rate Anchor  Monetary 
aggregate target 
Other 
US Dollar  Euro  Composite  Other 
Currency board 
arrangement 
Djibouti           
Other conventional 








Libya  Swaziland     
Crawling peg  Ethiopia           
Managed floating, 
no pre-determined path 
for exchange rate 






Independently floating          Zambia   




Given  the  specified  objective  of  full  economic  and  monetary  union,  exchange  rate 
variability within COMESA will disappear and, consequently, domestic autonomy over 
foreign exchange and monetary policies will then be lost. According to the optimum 
currency area theory,
5 such loss is less costly for open economies sharing high levels of 
bilateral trade, for the lost policy instruments would be of little use in such contexts. 
Costs also diminish when labour and capital are mobile and common fiscal stabilisers 
are available to substitute for the abandoned policy tools.  
                                                 
5  The  OCA  theory  was  firstly  developed  by  Mundell  (1961)  and  subsequently  enriched  with  the 
contributions of McKinnon (1963), Kenen (1969), and many others. Despite its many critics, it remains 
the most relevant theoretical reference to evaluate monetary integration. Dellas and Tavlas (2009) provide 
a recent review of the OCA literature. 6 
 
In addition, to prevent monetary integration from compromising economic development 
and social welfare, significant levels of real convergence should be attained, to reduce 
the number of asymmetric disturbances requiring differentiated adjustment responses. 
In  the  case  of  African  economies,  however,  the  relatively  high  degree  of  trade 
specialization  increases  the  likelihood  of  specific  shocks  and  the  potential  utility  of 
domestic shock absorbers. Not surprisingly, evaluations of prospective monetary unions 
in  Africa  tend  to  conclude  that  the  involved  economies  do  not  comply  with  OCA 
requirements. Even if actual monetary unions, such as the US or the Eurozone, fail to 
conform to such conditions, studies involving African and non-African nations show 
that the distance to the OCA paradigm is much larger in Africa (see Zhao and Kim, 
2009).  
The  conclusion  that  African  countries  appear  not  to  be  ready  for  full  monetary 
integration is rather robust, holding across time and geography and for studies assessing 
a  variety  of  variables.  Covering  a  large  spectrum  of  economies,  involved  in  four 
integration  projects,
6  Bayoumi  and  Ostry  (1997)  studied  the  size  and  correlation  of 
economic  disturbances  and  the  intensity  of  intraregional  trade,  concluding  that  all 
projects were far from constituting OCAs. Debrun, Masson and Pattillo (2005) proposed 
a  broad  theoretical  framework,  encompassing  institutional  and  political  credibility 
aspects and OCA considerations related to the synchronicity of shocks. Their model, 
calibrated with data for West African countries, was used to evaluate the prospect of 
monetary  integration  in  the  Economic  Community  of  West  African  States.  More 
recently, in addition to providing a comprehensive survey of the OCA literature in the 
African context, Debrun, Masson and Patillo (2011) extended their previous approach to 
                                                 
6  The  CFA  franc  zone,  the  Economic  Community  of  West  African  States,  the  Southern  African 
Development Coordination Conference and the Cross-Border Initiative. 7 
 
allow  comparisons  between  scenarios  of  monetary  integration  and  of  domestic 
institutional reforms. Assessing integration projects for the East African Community, 
Southern  African  Development  Community  and  the  Economic  Community  of  West 
African  States,  they  concluded  that,  in  spite  of  the  potential  benefits  of  monetary 
integration in terms of institutional credibility and fiscal discipline, in most cases such 
benefits would be inferior to the costs of being unable to stabilise specific shocks with 
domestic  policy  instruments  and  similar  to  what  could  be  achieved  with  domestic 
reforms. 
More  specific  studies  were  developed  by,  inter  alia,  Khamfula  and  Teseayohannes 
(2004),  who  analysed  OCA  conditions  within  the  Southern  African  Development 
Community, Buigut and Valev (2006), who studied demand and supply shocks hitting 
Eastern  and  Southern  African  economies,  Agbeyegbe  (2008)  who  assessed  nominal 
exchange  rate  and  inflation  convergence  in  the  Southern  Africa  Development 
Community, or Tsangarides (2008), who applied clustering algorithms to classify West 
African countries according to their compliance to OCA variables and to Maastricht 
type  convergence  criteria.  All  studies  produced  non-favourable  prognoses  over 
monetary  integration  in  the  analysed  communities.  COMESA  has  attracted  less 
attention from academics but, as Carmignani (2004) showed, this very heterogeneous 
set of countries also performed poorly, in view of its objective of becoming a monetary 
union, in terms of shocks’ symmetry, macroeconomic policy coordination and income 
per capita convergence. 
In sum, analyses of monetary integration in Africa indicate that, while some projects 
could in the future be successfully implemented, most countries still have to pursue a 
long route before being able to reap liquid economic benefits from monetary union. 8 
 
Current  processes  of  integration  should  thus  be  gradual  and  slow,  to  allow  for  the 
consolidation of progress attained with required convergence criteria and to provide 
sufficient time to learn how to deal with fixed foreign exchange rates, for instance in a 
system of adjustable pegs, as European countries did within the European Monetary 
System. 
In this study, we focus on the relatively less studied COMESA countries and evaluate 
the quality of four possible international currency pegs they could adopt in the path to 
monetary union. To this end, we  follow Bénassy-Quéré and  Lahrèche-Révil (2000), 
who used the OCA indices proposed by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) to select 
optimum monetary  and  foreign  exchange  anchors for Central and  Eastern European 
countries.  Bayoumi  and  Eichengreen  (1997)  operationalised  the  OCA  theory  by 
producing an index that decreases in value  with a country’s readiness  for monetary 
union with a reference economy. The authors first estimate an equation relating foreign 
exchange variability to OCA related variables - the asymmetry of business cycles, the 
openness  of  countries  to  foreign  trade,  the  dissimilarity  of  bilateral  exports  and  the 
relative  dimension  of  involved  economies  -  and  then  use  the  obtained  estimates  to 
calculate the OCA indices. The underlying hypothesis is that countries meeting OCA 
conditions to a greater degree face more stable exchange rates. Therefore, all the above 
mentioned OCA variables are  expected to be positively related to foreign  exchange 
variability, except for the openness to trade, as exchange rates tend to be less volatile for 
important trade partners. 
The index proposed by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) is not without limitations as 
an  instrument  to  assess  the  quality  of  a  group  of  countries  to  embark  in  monetary 
integration.  It  encapsulates  various  OCA  implications  and  is  thus  more  robust  than 9 
 
alternative methodologies focusing on single criteria, but it is a static indicator that fails 
to take into account the dynamic aspects of integration. If, as suggested by Frankel and 
Rose (1997), OCA characteristics are endogenous and convergence is easier within a 
single currency environment (i.e., if ‘monetary unions are more justifiable ex post than 
ex ante’), the OCA index would not be useful to evaluate integration projects.  
However, following Krugman (1991, 1993), economic and monetary integration will 
only  improve  the  OCA  characteristics  of  the  involved  countries  if  a  reduction  in 
transaction costs, resulting from eliminating foreign exchange variability, leads to an 
increase in the amount of intra-industry trade in the integrated area. If no significant 
trade  growth  occurs,  or  if  (due  to  productive  specialization)  trade  between  member 
countries  is  mainly  inter-industrial,  the  OCA  qualities  of  the  area  would  not  be 
enhanced  and  participating  countries  would  find  monetary  union  more  costly  than 
beneficial.  
The utility of the OCA index for our analysis resides in its informative power on the 
nature of dynamic developments that are most likely to unravel in a specific integration 
context (specifically, whether more specialization or more convergence is expected). As 
the index includes variables related to the asymmetry of shocks and to the type of trade 
between  countries,  it  allows  for  a  differentiation  between  more  and  less  prepared 
countries for monetary integration.
7    
Another  limitation  of  the  OCA  index  is  the  fact  that  it  does  not  take  into  account 
institutional  and  political  credibility  gains  from  monetary  integration.  According  to 
                                                 
7 In retrospect, the values of the OCA indices obtained by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) for European 
countries  would  have  been  more  valid  to  signal  less  prepared  countries  than  the  Maastricht  criteria.  
Countries that are currently facing the most difficulties coping with the single currency, such as Portugal, 
Greece,  Spain  and  Italy  (Ireland  is  the  non  identified  exception),  were  considered  by  the  authors  as 
‘converging  countries’,  i.e.,  not  yet  prepared  for  monetary  integration  with  the  group  of  ‘converged 
countries’. In the ten years that followed the adoption of the euro, these peripheral countries not only did 
not converge, but have worsen their previous current account and fiscal disequilibria, both in absolute 
terms and in relation to their Eurozone partners. 10 
 
Debrun, Masson and Pattillo (2005, 2011), these are relevant aspects to consider in 
Africa.  In  fact,  many  African  countries  face  problems  resulting  from  lack  of 
independent central banks, which are often forced to finance public deficits, and fiscal 
distortions, due to socially inefficient government spending. The authors considered that 
such problems could be ameliorated by giving up autonomy over domestic monetary 
policy, in favour of an independent supranational institution, and by accepting a set of 
fiscal discipline rules required for a well functioning monetary union. Nevertheless, as 
referred above, their analyses also concluded that, for most of the countries in their 
sample, the potential gains from a more restrict and credible institutional environment 
would  not  surpass  the  costs  from  giving  up  domestic  mechanisms  of  adjustment  to 
cushion economies affected by asymmetric shocks. 
Without disregarding the relevance of credibility arguments, in what follows we focus 
our  attention  on  pertinent  OCA  considerations,  aiming  at  identifying  the  less  costly 
pegging arrangements for COMESA countries, assuming such anchoring objective as an 
intermediate step in the way to full monetary union. 
 
3 – The optimum currency area determinants of exchange rate variability 
Following  Bayoumi  and  Eichengreen  (1997),  the  estimating  equation  assumes  the 
variability  of  bilateral  exchange  rates  to  be  dependent  upon  a  series  of  explanatory 
variables that encapsulate traditional OCA conditions: the asymmetry of business cycles 
between the two countries, the dissimilarity of the composition of exports, the bilateral 
openness ratio and the average economic dimension: 
  sderij = b0 + b1 sdyij + b2 dissimij + b3 btradeij + b4 sizeij + eij,                     (1) 11 
 
Since the main purpose of the paper is to assess the relative degree of compliance with 
the  OCA  conditions  of  the  African  countries  vis-a-vis  the  main  potential  monetary 
anchors, the estimation only considers the exchange rate behaviour between each of the 
56 countries in the sample, including 21 African nations, and the currently four main 
international currencies.
8 
The dependent variable sderij is the standard deviation, over an eleven-year period, of 
the yearly log-variations of the bilateral nominal exchange rate between countries i and 
j: 
  sderij =standard deviation [D (log erij)]                                                         (2) 
where erij is the nominal exchange rate between country i and country j in a given year. 
Here, j is either the US dollar, the euro, the yen or the British pound, the currencies of 
the four reference countries. Exchange rate variability in this period is higher when the 
yen is the partner currency, and very similar on average when considering the other 
three monetary anchors (see Table 2). Although not shown in the table, it is also slightly 
higher for the African countries than for the other nations in the sample.
9 
The asymmetry of business cycles, sdyij, is measured as the standard deviation of the 
difference in the real output growth rates between countries i and j: 
  sdyij = standard deviation [D (log yi)- D (log yj)],                                              (3) 
                                                 
8 The 56 countries are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Comoros, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Hong Kong, Hungary, 
India, Indonesia, Israel, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Morocco,  New  Zealand,  Nigeria,  Norway,  Pakistan,  Peru,  Philippines,  Poland,  Romania,  Rwanda, 
Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa, South Korea, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela and Zambia. 
9 Results not shown, but available upon request. The set of 21 Africa countries includes 15 COMESA 
members plus Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania and Tunisia. Four COMESA countries 
are not included (Congo, Djibouti, Libya and Zimbabwe) for lack of consistent data during most of the 
analysed time frame.  12 
 
where y stands for real output. In this sample, business cycles are on average somewhat 
more asymmetrical when the US or the UK are the partner countries or when African 
nations are involved. 
 
Table 2: Variability of African exchange rates against four reference currencies, 1999-2009 (%) 
Eurozone  US  Japan  UK 
Burundi  11.08  8.87  12.65  11.50 
Comoros  0.00  9.11  10.93  6.92 
Egypt  15.98  9.94  12.33  15.24 
Eritrea  8.88  8.79  8.23  11.53 
Ethiopia  8.99  6.15  11.96  5.66 
Ghana  15.94  21.76  24.27  18.45 
Kenya  7.48  5.95  11.69  6.62 
Madagascar  16.67  15.68  18.55  18.78 
Malawi  10.32  9.34  11.89  12.28 
Mauritius  6.50  7.15  7.08  8.54 
Morocco  3.00  6.87  8.49  6.28 
Nigeria  9.63  8.63  12.37  8.91 
Rwanda  10.21  6.68  10.35  11.08 
Seychelles  16.64  15.33  20.91  11.92 
South Africa  13.50  16.99  15.56  14.56 
Sudan  9.57  6.02  12.17  7.02 
Swaziland  13.50  16.99  15.56  14.56 
Tanzania  8.77  4.83  7.39  9.64 
Tunisia  2.28  7.17  9.81  6.51 
Uganda  8.60  8.25  12.38  6.62 
Zambia  15.16  16.17  18.88  15.57 
Note: The variability of the bilateral exchange rates is measured as the standard deviation of the log 
variations of the bilateral exchange rate with the Eurozone, the US, Japan and the UK in the period 
1999-2009. 
 
To quantify the degree of dissimilarity in export patterns, dissimij is computed as the 
sum of the absolute differences in the relative share of each of eleven categories of 
merchandise trade in each pair of countries,
10 
                                                 
10 A more detailed classification of exports could potentially reflect more accurately the differences in 
export patterns, but it is difficult to  find correct, complete and long datasets  when studying  African 
countries. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) considered only three categories of exports: manufactured 
goods,  food  and  minerals.  We  chose  the  more  detailed  and  informative  taxonomy  provided  by  the 










i ij X X dissim ,                                                                                      (4) 
where k is k-th product category and X
k is the product share in total merchandise trade. 
The computation of this variable has shown that, for this sample of countries and time 
period, the export structure is more dissimilar when Japan is the reference country, and 
also when considering the African countries. This probably reflects the high degree of 
specialization in the exports of agricultural and mineral primary products in some of 
these economies, as noted by Bayoumi and Ostry (1997).  
The variable btradeij is the mean of the ratio of bilateral exports to domestic GDP in 
both countries: 

















btrade                                                                            (5)
 
where  Xij  is  the  bilateral  export  flows  from  country  i  to  country  j.  This  bilateral 
openness variable registers, as expected for this sample, a lower value for the African 
states and when Japan and the UK are the reference countries. The African countries are 
on average considerably more open to the Eurozone than to any other reference partner. 
To account for the relative economic dimension of both economies, sizeij is the mean of 
the two countries' log of GDP, measured in US dollars: 




i ij GDP GDP size + =                                                                  (6) 
                                                                                                                                               
of products: 0 - Food and live animals, 1 - Beverages and tobacco, 2- Crude materials, inedible, except 
fuels, 3 - Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials, 4 - Animal and vegetable oils and fats, 5 – 
Chemicals, 6 - Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material, 7 - Machinery and transport equipment, 




Finally, eij is the stochastic error term. All variables are measured as averages over an 
eleven-year period, between 1999 and 2009. 
As previously referred,  countries displaying a higher degree of compliance to OCA 
conditions are expected to face more stable exchange rates, and thus all coefficients in 
equation  (1)  should  be  positive,  except  for  b3,  as  bilateral  exchange  rates  are 
presumably less volatile if the two countries are important trade partners. 
Data on bilateral nominal exchange rates, current GDP in US dollars and trade related 
variables (except for exports by product, used to calculate dissimijt,, collected from the 
United  Nations  COMTRADE  database)  were  computed  from  the  CEPII-Chelem 
database. GDP at constant prices in domestic currency is from the IMF's International 
Financial Statistics.  
Given the set of 56 countries in the sample and 4 reference partners, equation (1) was 
estimated  for  the  1999-2009  period  averages  with  a  total  of  224  observations.  The 
beginning of the sample was chosen to coincide with the emergence of the euro, but 
also because of difficulties in finding previous homogeneous data on trade composition 
for some of the African countries. 
 
3.1 - OLS estimation 
As often expected in this type of model, problems of heteroskedasticity emerged in the 
residuals  of  the  simple  OLS  estimation,  identified  with  the  Breusch-Pagan  test, 
potentially causing biased standard errors and consequently biased statistical inference. 
Therefore, heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors have been computed using the 
Huber-White sandwich estimator of variance to allow the fitting of the model. These 
robust standard errors allow more accurate hypothesis tests and confidence intervals. 15 
 
The  regression  specification  error  test  (RESET)  also  uncovered  problems  of  model 
specification, solved when using logs in the btrade and size variables and introducing a 
dummy variable do distinguish when Japan was the partner country (dJapan). During 
this  period,  as  noted  above,  these  countries'  bilateral  exchange  rates  with  Japan 
exhibited on average a significantly higher variability than with the other three partners. 
The cross-country estimation produced the following results: 
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Robust  standard  errors  are  reported  in  parentheses,  the  overall  R-squared  for  the 
goodness  of  fit  is  0.19  for  224  observations.  The  F-statistic  (7.11)  for  the  joint 
significance of the independent variables, here a Wald test using the robustly estimated 
variance matrix, rejects the null hypothesis that all coefficients in the model are zero. 
The  Ramsey  regression  specification  error  test,  after  the  few  changes  in  the  model 
specification reported above, did not reject the null hypothesis of no omitted variables, 
at the 5% significance level, with a test statistic of 2.32. 
All coefficients display the expected signs and, with the exception of dissim, all are 
statistically  significant  at  least  at  the  usual  95%  confidence  level.  The  probable 
explanation for the lack of significance of the variable measuring the dissimilarity in the 
composition of exports is that, being a secondary proxy for the asymmetry of shocks, its 
significance  may  be  overpowered  by  the  variable  measuring  output  disturbances,  a 
possibility also observed by Bénassy-Quéré and Lahrèche-Révil (2000). In fact, dissim 16 
 
becomes statistically significant when removing sdy from the equation, suggesting a 
collinearity problem, although the overall explanatory power of the model considerably 
decreases. 
The results thus seem to confirm the previous findings in Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1997) and Horváth (2007), suggesting that the standard OCA factors help explain the 
dynamics of bilateral exchange rate variability also in a more recent time period and 
with a completely different set of countries, including a large sample of African nations. 
 
3.2 - IV-GMM estimation 
The  OLS  estimation  results  above  may  be  misleading  if  any  of  the  regressors  are 
endogenously  determined  by  the  dependent  variable.  In  particular,  Bayoumi  and 
Eichengreen  (1998),  for  industrial  countries,  and  Devereux  and  Lane  (2003),  for 
industrial and developing countries, note that the volume of bilateral trade (lnbtrade) 
and  the  asymmetry  of  business  cycles  (sdy)  may  be  potentially  influenced  by  the 
variability of the bilateral exchange rate. Therefore, for a more consistent estimate of 
the model, we instrumented those two variables using the log-distance between both 
countries (lndistance), and three dummy variables indicating  whether both countries 
share a common border (border) or a common language (language) and if they had a 
colonial  relationship  in  the  past  (colonizer).  These  instruments  are  drawn  from  the 
traditional gravity model literature on bilateral trade flows, and have also been chosen 
by Devereux and Lane (2003) and, except for the variable colonizer since their studies 
only cover industrial nations, by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998) and Horváth (2005). 
Before  presenting  and  discussing  the  results  of  the  estimation  using  instrumental 
variables, it is convenient to check if this choice of instruments satisfies both necessary 17 
 
conditions of validity and relevance for the consistency of the instrumental-variables 
GMM estimator. The Hansen's J test statistic (0.0476, with a p-value of 0.9765) does 
not provide evidence against the validity of the instruments or the correct specification 
of the structural equation, giving confidence that the instrument set is appropriate. To 
assess  the  relevance  of  the  instruments,  Shea's  partial  R-squared  of  0.031  for  the 
variable  sdy  and  0.139  for  the  variable  lntrade  suggests,  as  expected,  that  these 
instruments are more relevant to explain trade flows than the asymmetry of economic 
shocks.
11 It is however difficult to draw definite conclusions from these values of the 
partial R-squared, for a lack of absolute standard references, as these statistics depend 
on the specifics of the data employed and of the model being estimated.  
Table  3  reports  the  estimation  results  by  GMM  with  a  heteroskedasticity-consistent 
weighting matrix, considering both endogenous variables (column 1) and also, in view 
of the previous test results on the relevance of the instruments, retaining sdy in the 
group of exogenous regressors (column 2). In this latter case, the partial R-square is 
0.1662 and the F-statistic for models with one endogenous regressor (lnbtrade), against 
the null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are not relevant, reports a statistic of 
15.7072. This value largely rejects the null and exceeds the minimum threshold of 10 
set by Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002) for inference to be reliable. The OLS estimates 





                                                 
11 Devereux and Lane (2003) and Horváth (2005) obtained relatively similar partial R-squared values for 
these two variables. 18 
 
Table 3: IV-GMM regressions 
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GMM estimates, with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity in parentheses. Equation (1) uses the instruments 
dissim, lnsize, dJapan, colonizer, lndistance, border and language for the endogenous variables sdy and lnbtrade. 
Equation (2) uses the instruments sdy, dissim, lnsize, dJapan, colonizer, lndistance, border and language for the 
endogenous variable lnbtrade. First-stage results not reported. The J-statistic is Hansen's J test of overidentifying 
restrictions (P-values in parentheses). The C-statistic stands for the Sargan test of endogenous regressors (P-values in 
parentheses). Column (3) replicates the OLS estimates obtained before. The asterisks ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
 
When both sdy and lnbtrade are treated as endogenous variables, only the latter retains 
statistical significance in the regression. When only lnbtrade is considered endogenous, 
the results are very similar to the ones obtained before using simple OLS: apart from 
dissim, all other OCA variables display the expected signs and statistical significance. 
However, both Sargan's C tests of endogeneity (orthogonality conditions), reported in 
the bottom line of the table, fail to reject the null hypothesis that these regressors are in 
fact  exogenous.  This  implies  that  although  the  instrumental  variables  estimator  is 
consistent,  since  the  test  statistics  discussed  above  suggest  that  the  instruments 
employed are both valid and relevant, it is also inefficient. The OLS estimator is more 





4 - The optimum currency area indices 
The equation estimated above can be employed, as in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997), 
to  compute  an  index  comparing  each  individual  country's  OCA  characteristics, 
relatively to a reference country. In the particular case of the African countries, this may 
help discern which groups of countries share identical OCA features, rendering them 
more  suitable  to  take  part  in  a  monetary  union,  and  may  also  help  clarify  which 
international currency should, if they choose to, be preferred as an anchor currency. 
The index values in Table 4 are computed for the relationship between the individual 
African countries and each of the four reference currencies. The index corresponds to 
the  fitted  value  for  the  exchange  rate  variability  using  the  point  estimates  of  the 
parameters obtained above in the OLS regression. The index is thus a weighted sum of 
each country's various OCA conditions considered here, taking the equation above as 
deterministic. The smaller the value of the index, the more would a country benefit from 
pegging its currency to the reference country. 
The least integrated countries, with higher indices whatever the reference partner, are 
almost  invariably  Eritrea,  Nigeria,  Ethiopia  and  Malawi  (only  Nigeria  is  not  in 
COMESA).  On  the  other  side  of  the  spectrum,  the  more  integrated  countries  rank 
differently for different reference partners. The top four in the rankings are precisely the 
same and in the same order when considering the US or the UK (Swaziland, Mauritius, 
Comoros and Ghana – the first three are COMESA economies), but differ slightly when 
the reference partner is the Eurozone, and substantially against Japan. The margins of 
error around the predicted values of the model are displayed in parentheses. 20 
 
 
Table 4: Rankings of OCA indices for the African countries 
Eurozone  US  Japan  UK 
Burundi  0.0900 (.0739-.1061)  0.1107 (.0938-.1275)  0.1212 (.1005-.1419)  0.0903 (.0699-.1108) 
Comoros  0.0736 (.0496-.0976)  0.0827 (.0609-.1046)  0.1167 (.0902-.1432)  0.0769 (.0481-.1057) 
Egypt  0.0929 (.0831-.1027)  0.1059 (.0925-.1192)  0.1362 (.1210-.1514)  0.1061 (.0942-.1180) 
Eritrea  0.1349 (.1081-.1616)  0.1630 (.1220-.2040)  0.1738 (.1391-.2085)  0.1337 (.1047-.1627) 
Ethiopia  0.1213 (.1047-.1379)  0.1360 (.1153-.1568)  0.1507 (.1318-.1697)  0.1336 (.1147-.1526) 
Ghana  0.0755 (.0592-.0919)  0.0907 (.0793-.1021)  0.1130 (.0960-.1300)  0.0780 (.0612-.0949) 
Kenya  0.0906 (.0816-.0996)  0.1023 (.0928-.1118)  0.1286 (.1132-.1439)  0.0884 (.0770-.0998) 
Madagascar  0.1142 (.0939-.1345)  0.1233 (.1032-.1435)  0.1524 (.1322-.1726)  0.1242 (.1052-.1432) 
Malawi  0.1252 (.1026-.1478)  0.1301 (.1089-.1513)  0.1567 (.1333-.1800)  0.1253 (.1034-.1471) 
Mauritius  0.0712 (.0521-.0903)  0.0808 (.0666-.0951)  0.1151 (.0976-.1326)  0.0683 (.0455-.0911) 
Morocco  0.0967 (.0833-.1101)  0.1173 (.1018-.1328)  0.1385 (.1237-.1534)  0.1045 (.0936-.1153) 
Nigeria  0.1317 (.1045-.1589)  0.1302 (.1018-.1585)  0.1630 (.1386-.1873)  0.1403 (.1175-.1631) 
Rwanda  0.0990 (.0867-.1114)  0.1164 (.1008-.1321)  0.1463 (.1242-.1684)  0.0973 (.0814-.1132) 
Seychelles  0.0901 (.0678-.1123)  0.1265 (.1087-.1443)  0.1359 (.1164-.1555)  0.0877 (.0615-.1139) 
South Africa  0.0788 (.0681-.0895)  0.0911 (.0812-.1010)  0.1027 (.0858-.1197)  0.0807 (.0709-.0904) 
Sudan  0.1009 (.0838-.1179)  0.1289 (.1008-.1570)  0.1179 (.0983-.1375)  0.1044 (.0886-.1202) 
Swaziland  0.0691 (.0497-.0886)  0.0673 (.0476-.0870)  0.1196 (.0942-.1449)  0.0669 (.0424-.0915) 
Tanzania  0.0898 (.0784-.1011)  0.1048 (.0906-.1191)  0.1151 (.0979-.1322)  0.0918 (.0784-.1052) 
Tunisia  0.0668 (.0488-.0847)  0.0921 (.0807-.1035)  0.1240 (.1072-.1408)  0.0801 (.0659-.0943) 
Uganda  0.0885 (.0762-.1008)  0.1056 (.0906-.1205)  0.1293 (.1133-.1453)  0.0921 (.0787-.1056) 
Zambia  0.0902 (.0782-.1021)  0.1072 (.0929-.1216)  0.1233 (.1068-.1398)  0.0805 (.0610-.1000) 
Notes:  The  index  is  computed  with  the  OLS  regression  estimates  obtained  above,  for  the  bilateral 
relationships with the Eurozone, the US, Japan and the UK. The margin of errors around predicted 
values is in parentheses. 
 
Overall,  these  African  countries  appear  to  be  generally  more  integrated  with  the 
Eurozone and the UK and less integrated with the US and Japan, as the OCA indices’ 
averages for the four references are 0.0948, 0.0977, 0.1101 and 0.1324, respectively. 
When only COMESA members are considered, the average values are a little higher: 
0.0968 for the Eurozone, 0.0984 for the UK, 0.1125 for the US and 0.1349 for Japan.  
Taking the indices as indicators of readiness to give up foreign exchange variability, the 
results  suggest  that  not  all  COMESA  members  should  fix  their  currencies 
simultaneously. Countries with values above average are relatively less prepared for a 
fixed exchange rate regime and would benefit from postponing pegging their currencies, 21 
 
fixing only after more prepared partners have done so. In case of choosing the euro or 
the British pound as anchors, the countries that should postpone the pegging of their 
currencies are Eritrea, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi and Sudan. Rwanda and Egypt 
should wait only if fixing against the euro and the pound, respectively. 
The differences in the indices may be more perceptible in figures 1 to 3, where the 
values for the Eurozone are graphically compared with the same indices for each of the 
other three partners. The closer to the origin, the more prepared countries are to deal 
with the constraints of a pegged currency, according to the OCA theory. All points 
below the 45-degree line from the origin indicate an index for that particular country 
lower when considering the Eurozone (vertical axis) than the respective index with the 
other partner (horizontal axis). 
 
Figure 1: OCA indices for African countries, Eurozone and US  
 
As may be seen in Figure 1, the OCA indices against the US dollar are systematically 












































OCA indices when considering the US as the partner country rather than the Eurozone. 
Coincidentally, these are the only two African countries in the sample where the US is a 
more relevant trade partner than the Eurozone during the analysed period. Eritrea and 
Ethiopia,  a  single  country  until  1993,  display  the  higher  OCA  index  values  with 
reference to the US. Swaziland, the small landlocked country in Southern Africa, and 
Comoros and Mauritius, two archipelago island nations in the Indian Ocean, located off 
the Eastern coast of Africa, appear to be the most integrated with the US. Of these, only 
Mauritius currently pegs its currency to the dollar. 
Bénassy-Quéré and Lahrèche-Révil (2000), using a slightly different methodology for 
the pre-euro period, also concluded that the only four African countries present in their 
sample should prefer to peg their currencies to the euro over the US dollar. 
 
Figure 2: OCA indices for African countries, Eurozone and Japan  
 
All countries exhibit considerably lower OCA indices when considering the Eurozone, 















































OCA Indices, Japan23 
 
country with Japan, displaying the lowest value of the OCA index. Sudan, the closest 
country to the 45 degree line, is the only African nation in the sample for which Japan is 
a more important trade partner than the Eurozone, or even the UK or the US. 
 
Figure 3: OCA indices for African countries, Eurozone and the UK  
 
Figure  3  suggests  that  the  British  pound  is,  of  the  three  alternatives,  the  strongest 
contender to the euro as the least economically costly anchor currency for the African 
nations considered here, according to the OCA conditions. Even so, only a third of the 
countries (all but Kenya are COMESA members) display higher OCA indices against 
the euro than against the British pound, and with a very slight advantage, as all stand 
very  close  to  the  45  degree  line.  All  are  English-speaking  countries  and,  with  the 
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5  –  The  optimum  currency  area  indices  and  Africa's  Regional  Economic 
Communities  
In view of their commitment to attain full monetary integration by the end of the 20s, 
COMESA countries have been advised to first experience a period of foreign exchange 
pegging against a foreign anchor. The OCA indices obtained above are useful to inform 
the discussion on which peg would be more appropriate, but also to evaluate the degree 
of integration within COMESA and in several African regional economic communities. 
COMESA  countries  display  heterogeneous  levels  of  integration,  with  Swaziland, 
Mauritius and Comoros emerging as the most integrated members, irrespective of the 
reference currency, but other sets of countries with close OCA index values are also 
discernible. For example, the degree of economic integration between Kenya, Tanzania 
and Uganda is clear in the three figures above, all displaying very close index values for 
these countries. These three neighbours from Central East Africa, all bordering Lake 
Victoria,  established  since  2000  the  East  African  Community,  but  have  since  the 
beginning of the XX century a long record of economic collaboration, formalized in 
almost  consecutive  regional  arrangements  –  currently,  Kenya  and  Uganda  are  also 
members of COMESA. Although significantly more integrated with the euro area than 
with the US or Japan, the index values for these former members of the British empire 
are however very similar when measured against the euro area or the UK. 
A similar situation occurs in Rwanda and Burundi, two COMESA economies that form 
the  Economic  Community  of  Great  Lakes  Countries  with  Congo.  These  small 
neighbour  countries  also  appear  very  close  in  the  figures  above,  suggesting  a  high 
degree of economic integration. In their case, again, both the euro and the British pound 
appear to be the best choices of anchor currency. 25 
 
Much less integrated appear to be the members of other African regional communities, 
such as the Arab Maghreb Union (of which Morocco and Tunisia are included in this 
study),  the  Indian  Ocean  Commission  (integrating  inter  alia  Comoros,  Madagascar, 
Mauritius  and  Seychelles),  the  Intergovernmental  Authority  on  Development  (that 
includes for example Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda, the countries in the 
Horn of Africa) or the Southern Africa Development Community (including, from our 
sample,  Malawi,  Mauritius,  Seychelles,  South  Africa,  Swaziland,  Tanzania  and 
Zambia). The differences in the values of the OCA indices between these countries, 
whatever the reference partner considered, suggest that they are still not ready for full 
monetary integration. 
Our analysis is based on a methodology that strictly considers bilateral pegs between a 
client and an anchor currency, neglecting the ‘trade network externalities’ identified by 
Meissner and Oomes (2009) as a key determinant of currency peg choice. In this sense, 
the choice of an anchor may be influenced by the fact that neighbouring and relevant 
trade partners have pegged to a particular currency. Therefore, expected trade creation 
effects resulting from lower transaction costs could justify the choice of a sub-optimal 
currency. This could for instance be considered by COMESA countries still pegging 
against the dollar or displaying lower OCA indices against the British pound than the 
euro.  However,  trade  network  externalities  are  relatively  less  relevant  for  African 
countries as the weight of commercial exchanges with neighbours is rather low, even 





6 – Conclusions 
The OCA index proposed by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) was utilised to evaluate 
the quality of four potential anchors – the euro, the US dollar, the British pound and the 
yean – for COMESA countries, and a set of other selected African economies, if they 
decide to peg domestic currencies to an international money in their way to monetary 
union. The pegging strategy has been defended as a way of locking up success attained 
in  the  process  of  integration  while,  simultaneously,  providing  both  the  experience 
needed to manage domestic economies in a more restricted policy environment and the 
time to adapt before abandoning autonomy over instruments that may be useful in the 
adjustment to asymmetric shocks. 
Although disregarding explicit dynamic and institutional credibility effects, the index 
encapsulates  various  OCA  requirements  and  may  be  interpreted  as  an  indicator  for 
individual countries’ readiness for monetary integration. The estimates obtained in this 
study suggest that not all COMESA members are equally prepared, and thus should not 
advance at the same speed, to monetary union. Countries displaying lower OCA indices 
should peg first, while the others should follow only after having attained higher levels 
of economic integration. This is even more relevant in the African context, where the 
relatively high level of productive specialization suggests that lower transaction costs 
will  mainly  promote  inter-industrial  trade  (associated  to  more  asymmetric  shocks) 
within integrated areas. Furthermore, some of the assessed member countries seem to be 
more prepared to embark on alternative monetary arrangements than to commit to full 
integration in the context of this community.  
Despite the fact that currently eight COMESA countries have their currencies pegged to 
the dollar, and only two to the euro, these economies are generally more integrated with 27 
 
the Eurozone and the UK than with the US or Japan. Focusing only on the possibility of 
pegging  against  the  euro  or  the  pound,  three  groups  of  countries  emerge  within 
COMESA, in terms of their readiness to fix domestic currencies: Swaziland, Mauritius 
and Comoros, displaying the lowest OCA index values, form the most integrated group; 
Madagascar, Ethiopia,  Malawi and Eritrea are  the less integrated; Burundi, Uganda, 
Zambia, Seychelles, Tanzania, Rwanda, Egypt and Sudan comprise the intermediate set. 
Some of these countries, for example Swaziland, Mauritius, Zambia or Rwanda, would 
probably marginally benefit from pegging their currencies against the British pound, 
while the remaining eleven COMESA members in our sample should peg to the euro. 
All these countries have agreed to achieve full monetary integration in the context of 
COMESA. Therefore, the groupings identified in this analysis should not be taken as 
evidence that a number of countries should embark on closer economic associations 
amongst  themselves,  but  rather  that  some  appear  to  be  more  prepared  for  an 
intermediate  phase  of  fixing  domestic  moneys  against  a  foreign  peg,  before  full 
monetary union. The groupings also indicate that a single peg appears not to be equally 
adequate for the whole set of COMESA countries. However, the hypothesis of pegging 
to a currency basket instead of a single currency has not been formally considered in 
this paper. It is nevertheless an option which may be particularly attractive for those 
countries where no clear superiority of an international monetary anchor over another 
has  emerged  in  the  analysis.  Potential  benefits  arising  from  joint  pegs  to  the  same 
external anchor, namely trade network externalities, should also be considered in such 
cases. 
Overall,  the  information  provided  by  the  OCA  indices  suggests  that  the  COMESA 
group is not yet well suited for monetary integration. Some of its members are already 28 
 
quite integrated, but the whole set is heterogeneous, with various countries closer to 
third  countries  (with  which,  in  some  cases,  they  share  membership  in  other 
communities) than to their COMESA counterparts. In spite of the expected institutional 
and political credibility gains from monetary integration, the experience of the Eurozone 
suggests  that  monetary  integration  involving  economies  in  distinct  stages  of 
convergence is not beneficial for the least prepared, and can seriously compromise their 
growth  and  employment  perspectives.  Fiscal  discipline  and  other  integration 
requirements  increase  the  social  and  economic  costs  of  adjusting  to  specific 
disturbances and add to the difficulties in conquering and maintaining competitiveness. 
Though  Mundell  (2002)  defended  that  ‘monetary  stability  is  not  everything,  but, 
without  it,  the  rest  is  nothing’,  African  countries  should  not  rush  into  monetary 
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